On June 2, Stephen Curry announced on social media that his personal brand, Curry Brand, had signed a partnership with Li-Ning.
ESPN, citing sources, said the ten-year agreement covers basketball products, sports lifestyle apparel, Curry’s right to sign athletes under his personal brand, and a full line of golf clubs. The financial terms were not disclosed.
Li-Ning became Curry’s new partner after his 12-year relationship with Under Armour ended in November 2025. Anta had also been in contact with Curry and, according to media reports, was at one point considered close to a deal, but no agreement materialized. Speculation has focused not only on price, but also on the autonomy Li-Ning was willing to offer.
Curry has a history of choosing challenger brands. 13 years ago, he left Nike for Under Armour, then still an upstart in sportswear. One often-retold version of the story claims Nike had so many stars that it mispronounced Curry’s name during a pitch meeting and left traces of another player in the presentation deck. Under Armour seized the opening and turned the episode into part of its brand narrative.
At first, Curry was simply an Under Armour athlete. In November 2020, he gained his own sub-brand within the company: Curry Brand. It later released signature shoes from Curry 8 to Curry 13, opened its first standalone store in Chengdu, and signed athletes such as De’Aaron Fox.
The more important point is that when Curry split with Under Armour in 2025, he took the independent brand with him. Under the agreement, Curry retained the trademarks and IP of Curry Brand and was free to seek a new retail partner. Under Armour folded the separation into a restructuring plan with costs of up to about USD 255 million.
Most athlete deals are essentially purchases of traffic and influence. Li-Ning’s agreement with Curry is different. It requires the company to use its supply chain and R&D resources to support an independent brand it does not own. That asset could one day be packed up and moved elsewhere. Not every company would accept that imbalance.
Curry’s deep involvement in product design adds to the complexity. In an interview two years ago, Curry described to 36Kr his active participation in the development of Curry 12, from two-dimensional sketches to 3D modeling and final samples, requesting changes to elements he disagreed with creatively. Any company working with Curry Brand must therefore invest resources while giving up a meaningful degree of control.
Why Li-Ning had more to offer
Over the past few years, Under Armour has streamlined its organization and controlled costs to cope with growth pressure. Although it opened an independent Curry Brand store in Chengdu, its later investment became more cautious. For Curry, who wanted to expand his personal brand, that was not enough.
In this deal, Li-Ning appears to have been the finalist willing to offer more.
Anta already has no shortage of NBA stars. It signed Klay Thompson away from Nike in 2014, and the KT series is now in its tenth generation, making it the longest-running signature shoe collaboration between an active NBA player and a Chinese brand. In 2023, Anta signed Kyrie Irving, created the Kai series, and named him chief creative officer. With Gordon Hayward and others, Anta has signed more than ten NBA players, giving it the largest NBA roster among Chinese sportswear brands.
Curry would be valuable to Anta, but not irreplaceable. For Curry, joining Anta would mean he would not be the only franchise star. Resources would inevitably be spread across Kai, KT, and other established product lines, each with its own sales base and overseas channels. Curry would be an addition, not the centerpiece.
Li-Ning is different. Since Dwyane Wade retired in 2019, the company has lacked a top NBA endorser with global influence. Its basketball resources have been concentrated more in the CBA and the domestic market. With Curry on board, Curry Brand could absorb a much larger share of Li-Ning’s basketball resources. More importantly, Curry retains the right to sign athletes for Curry Brand, a major condition that is easier to secure from a partner with fewer alternatives.
The potential conflicts extend beyond basketball. Curry Brand also covers golf, one of Curry’s major interests as he enters the later stage of his playing career. Anta already has deep golf exposure through Fila and Descente, meaning Curry Brand’s golf line would likely overlap with existing group brands. At Li-Ning, that space is largely open.
For Li-Ning, which has long wanted to increase its overseas influence, the deal offers a route it previously lacked. Curry Brand could help Li-Ning enter the largely untapped market for sponsorships of top US college and high school athletes, and possibly even schoolwide agreements.
A deal built on asymmetry
The financial contrast shows why each side needed the deal differently.
In 2025, Anta Sports recorded revenue of RMB 80.2 billion (USD 11.8 billion), up 13.3% year-on-year. Including Amer Sports, the group’s total revenue had already exceeded RMB 100 billion (USD 14.7 billion) in 2024. With brands such as Arc’teryx, Salomon, Wilson, Descente, and Kolon, Anta holds about 23% of China’s sportswear market and ranks among the world’s top three sportswear groups. For a company with multiple brands and rising performance, Curry would be one option among many.
Li-Ning’s position is smaller and more constrained. In 2025, it generated RMB 29.6 billion (USD 4.4 billion) in revenue, up 3.2%, with net profit of RMB 2.9 billion (USD 426.8 million) and a net margin of 9.9%. The business was stable, but its growth was modest, and its scale was less than 40% of Anta Sports. Curry may be the only card in Li-Ning’s hand that can immediately shift its global basketball narrative.
In other words, Li-Ning needs Curry more than Curry needs Li-Ning. The fact that the cooperation was announced by Curry himself, rather than by the brand or jointly by both sides, may suggest where the balance of power sits.
Curry’s ambition for Curry Brand resembles Michael Jordan’s ambition for Jordan Brand. Whether Li-Ning can help turn Curry Brand into the next Jordan Brand remains uncertain, and at least two barriers are clear.
The first is that Jordan’s model has proved almost impossible to copy. Nike and Jordan pioneered an athlete royalty structure in 1984, with Jordan earning a share from every pair of shoes sold. Estimates put the royalty rate at around 5%, or a more conservative 4%. In 2024 alone, that reportedly generated about USD 300 million for Jordan. Jordan Brand revenue rose from about USD 2.8 billion in 2018 to around USD 7 billion in 2024, accounting for 13.6% of Nike’s revenue. It has effectively become an independent brand inside Nike. No sportswear company has replicated that model, including Nike itself.
The second barrier is that basketball’s return profile has changed. Even if a Jordan-like star emerged today, recreating Jordan Brand’s trajectory would be difficult in a slower category. Li-Ning must figure out how to turn Curry and his portable independent brand into a growth engine rather than an expensive marketing line item.
KrASIA features translated and adapted content that was originally published by 36Kr. This article was written by He Zhexin for 36Kr.
Note: RMB figures are converted to USD at rates of RMB 6.79 = USD 1 based on estimates as of June 9, 2026, unless otherwise stated. USD conversions are presented for ease of reference and may not fully match prevailing exchange rates.